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Abstract 
Within categories where ‘people’ are implicitly assumed to be male, people explain 
gender differences as being ‘about women’ rather than being ‘about men.’  In two 
experiments (N = 102) this bias was reversed within the category ‘voters.’ 
Participants generalized data about women or men to men or women and explained 
the resulting gender differences.  Participants always took ‘the effect to be predicted’ 
as ‘the effect to be explained’ whether their predictions were unconstrained 
(Experiment 1) or constrained by forced-choice items (Experiment 2).  People can 
reason about gender differences by taking women as the default gender, even within 
categories that are traditionally normed on men.   Implications for the communication 
of gender differences and the bases of androcentric thinking are discussed.   
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Both within and beyond psychology, the best means of communicating gender 
differences and similarities have been a matter of some debate (Baumeister, 1988; 
Kitzinger, 1994; McHugh, Koeske, & Frieze, 1986; Mednick, 1989; Scarr, 1988).  
Depending on the way that gender differences are reported, they can produce 
stereotype threat effects (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999), render workplace 
discrimination invisible (Rutte et al., 1994), lead to the selective blaming of individual 
women workers for failures (McGill, 1993), and reinforce gender stereotypes 
(Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004).   Thus, it is crucial for feminist psychology to 
understand how people make sense of the gender difference findings that the social 
sciences routinely produce.  
 The present research examines how androcentrism affects the interpretation of 
gender differences.  Androcentrism consists of both the tendency to take men as the 
norm for social categories, and the consequent tendency to attribute gender 
differences to women (Bem, 1993).  Below, I explain why taking one group as the 
norm leads the other to become ‘the effect to be explained,’ report two experiments 
that show how explanations of gender differences can be manipulated to become less 
androcentric, and discuss implications for the construction and communication of 
gender difference findings.     
 
Androcentrism and the Explanation of Difference 
 
Bem (1993) describes androcentrism as a pervasive cultural bias that affects 
interpretations of both gender similarities and gender differences. Thus, where gender 
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differences are not mentioned, men are assumed to be the norm for the species, but 
where gender differences are evident, such differences are assumed to inhere in 
women (see also Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990).  Evidence of androcentric thinking 
abounds in psychology.  Maleness is the ‘default’ value for many social categories 
(Stroessner, 1996; Zárate & Smith, 1990), male pronouns are used to represent 
females and males (Hamilton, 1988, 1991; Hyde, 1984; Martyna, 1980), and the 
categories of ‘people’ and ‘men’ are confused more quickly than are the categories of 
‘people’ and ‘women’ (e.g., Broverman et al., 1970; Eagly & Kite, 1986).     
The second component of androcentric thought has also been evidenced.  
Miller, Taylor, and Buck (1991) found that participants overwhelmingly called to 
mind male exemplars when asked to think of a typical voter, yet explained gender 
differences in voting behaviour in terms of women’s attributes.  Participants also 
considered men’s voting behaviour to be relatively fixed and women’s to be relatively 
mutable.  Miller et al. (1991) argued that people form working mental representations 
of social categories called category norms to generate explanations (c.f., Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986).  Category norms are formed from accessible exemplars of the category, 
whose attributes become implicit defaults against which other category members are 
compared.  In other words, because people mentally instantiate ‘voters’ with 
exemplars that are male, males’ distinctive attributes become normative, and gender 
differences are attributed to women. 
 To counter gender-based discrimination it is necessary to undo such 
androcentric thinking about group differences.  Biological explanations of gender 
stereotypes can strengthen gender stereotypes (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004), but 
androcentric explanations explicitly link women’s attributes to gender status more 
than they do for men, such that women will bear the brunt of such stereotyping.  
Indeed, essentialist ideas are selectively used to explain stereotype-consistent sexual 
orientation differences, but such explanations focus on lesbians and gay men, and not 
on heterosexual women and men (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004).   Category norms 
can also license discrimination by confusing the particular attributes of one group 
with general standards for all (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Walzdus, 2004).  
Thus, women are disadvantaged by courts which presume men’s perspective on issues 
such as sexual harassment to be a valid standard for all (Perry, Kulik, & Bourhis, 
2004).  In contrast, male advantage might be characterized by freedom from 
stereotyping and by legal privilege that follows from conflation of one’s particular 
subjectivity with the norm. 
If explanations are determined by category norms, then there are at least three 
ways that androcentric explanations might be undone.  First, where women are the 
more typical members of a category, androcentrism should be reduced.  Miller et al. 
(1991) found this to be so when participants explained gender differences among 
elementary school teachers.   Hegarty and Pratto (2001) similarly found participants’ 
explanations of differences between gay and straight men to typically focus on gay 
men, except differences among ‘men living with HIV/AIDS.’  Second, the difference 
being explained may affect the relative focus on women or men.  Hegarty and Pratto 
(2001) observed that explanations of differences between straight and gay men 
focused on whichever group was described as doing more, rather than less, of a given 
behaviour.  Indeed, there is a general preference for ‘more than’ over ‘less than’ 
constructions of many kinds of differences (see Clark, 1969).  Thus, where men do 
more of a behaviour than women, the tendency to focus explanations on women will 
be reduced.   
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Third, Kahneman and Miller (1986) insisted that category norms are fleeting 
mental representations constructed ‘on the fly,’ and that different category norms can 
be called to mind for the same social category.  Hegarty and Chryssochoou (2005) 
similarly argued that when people generalize a finding from one group to another that 
they form a temporary norm around the first group (i.e., the premise) that makes 
salient the distinctive attributes of the group to which they are generalizing (the 
conclusion, see also Sloman, 1993).  Their participants generalized findings between 
EU countries and then explained resulting differences.  Participants’ explanations 
focused overwhelming on the country to which they generalized, and two other 
findings were consistent with Hegarty and Chryssochoou’s (2005) hypotheses; 
distinctive attributes of participants’ in-group blocked generalization and reduced the 
perceived similarity between countries more when it was a conclusion than when it 
was a premise.  These findings show that people can instantiate quite different norms 
for ‘EU countries’ that weigh heavily whichever exemplar of that category is 
positioned as the premise.  As such they suggest that androcentrism might be undone 
when people generalize from women to men prior to explaining gender differences.    
The present research addressed this question.  I predicted that explanations of 
gender differences would focus on men more than women when women were 
rendered the premise group, even within Miller et al’s (1991) classic androcentric 
category of ‘voters.’   Hegarty and Chryssochoou (2005) found participants to focus 
explanations on whichever of two highly typical EU countries was positioned as the 
premise.  However, the present studies additionally tested whether manipulating the 
premise group’s identity would be sufficient to undo long-standing effects of 
androcentrism in a social category.   
Although explanation content was the primary dependent measure in these 
studies, they also allowed a  further examination of the relationship between 
explanation contents and judgments about the mutability of women’s and men’s 
behaviour.   Miller et al. (1991) argued that explanation content and mutability 
judgments were causally linked, but produced no evidence to support their claim.  
Hegarty and Pratto (2001) found explanation content and perceived mutability to be 
uncorrelated.  The present studies allowed a further examination of this issue.    
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants.  Forty-seven female and thirteen male university students 
participated (age = 18-47 years, M = 21.1 years).   They identified their nationalities 
as British (n = 55), Italian (n = 2), Cypriot (n = 1), Greek (n = 1) and Irish (n = 1).   
 
 Materials.  The principal stimuli were four versions of a questionnaire 
describing women’s and men’s voting intentions.  There were two two-premises 
versions, and two one-premise version.  In the female larger effect two-premise 
conditions, participants were presented with materials that read as follows: 
 
 A recent MORI poll has shown that British men and women have different 
 levels of interest in political participation.   In a recent survey 1,000 men and 
 1,000 women were polled.  58% of women and 43% of men said that they 
 would be certain to vote if a general election were held in the UK this year. 
 
 4 
In the male larger effect condition these percentages were reversed.   
 Data about one gender only was presented in each one-premise condition.  The 
male voter premise materials read as follows;  
 
 A recent MORI poll has shown that British men and women have different 
 levels of interest in political participation.   In a recent survey 1,000 
 men and 1,000 women were polled.  51% of men said that they would be 
 certain to vote if a general election were held in the UK this year. 
 The overall percentage of women was different from this.  What percentage of 
 women do you think said that they would be certain to vote?         % 
 
In the female voter premise condition, identical information about women was 
presented, and men were positioned as ‘the effect to be predicted.’  
 In all conditions participants were instructed to explain in their own words 
why a gender difference had been observed.  Next, the following mutability item was 
presented in all conditions; 
 
 Imagine that a second poll were conducted and no gender differences were 
 found. What overall percentage of people do you think would say they were 
 certain to vote in a general election?        % 
 
Finally, participants completed open-ended demographic measures.  
 
 Procedure. In both experiments, undergraduate volunteer participants were 
randomly assigned to condition and completed the materials during class.  Afterwards 
participants were debriefed about the falsity of the results presented and the 
hypotheses.  Study results were presented two weeks later.  The experiments were 
conducted in Britain early in 2005, prior to the government’s announcement that a 
general election would be held later that year.  
 
 Calculation of Dependent Variables.  Participants’ written explanations were 
coded for the presence of references to women’s and men’s attributes.  References to 
traits (e.g., ‘women are more pro-active’), to actions (e.g., ‘men pay more attention to 
politics’), to mental states (e.g., ‘women feel that men are ahead of them’) and to roles 
(‘men are still the main breadwinner’) were all counted as references to the relevant 
gender group.  Explanatory statements were coded as additional references (e.g., ‘men 
are more aggressive and so want to change the society they live in’ = two references 
to men).  Adjectives were coded as additional references (e.g., ‘men are lazy 
alcoholics’ = two references to men).  One judge coded all explanations for both 
experiments.  A second judge independently coded 25% of the references across the 
experiments.  High agreement between judges was observed regarding references to 
both women and men r (20) = .92, .89 respectively.  The first judge’s code was used.  
 For each participant mutability scores were calculated for each gender as the 
difference between the percentage of that gender groiup who were estimated to vote 
according to the first and the second poll. In the two-premises conditions, both 
estimates for the first poll were provided by the stimuli. In the one-premise condition, 
participants constructed one of these estimates themselves.  Responses to the 
mutability item always provided the estimate for the second poll.  
Results 
 Results were analyzed separately for the one- and two-premise conditions.  
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Two-Premise Conditions.   The explanation data was analyzed using a 2 
(larger effect) x 2 (gender group referenced) ANOVA.  Women were referenced more 
than men overall (Ms = 2.00, 1.03 respectively), F (1, 28) = 7.55, p =.01, η2 = .21, 
demonstrating androcentrism.  An interaction between group referenced and condition 
was also observed, F (1, 28) = 11.60,  p <.01, η2 = .29.  Post hoc tests showed that 
participants explained men less than women when women were the larger effect, and 
both groups equally when men were the larger effect (see Table 1).1    
 An equivalent 2x2 ANOVA was conducted on the mutability judgments in the 
two-premises condition with larger effect group as a between-subjects factor and 
target gender group as a within subject factor.  Neither main effect nor the interaction 
was significant, all F <1.   
             
Table 1: References in Explanations and Mutability by Condition, Experiment 1 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses). 
             
Target Group Women       Men        Women Men   
Explanations           Mutability 
Two-Premises Conditions  
     Female Majority 2.69 (1.08)  0.68 (1.25) 10.56 (8.28)  9.06   (4.25) 
     Male Majority 1.21 (1.21) 1.43 (1.28) 13.00 (9.99)   11.43 (10.76) 
One Premise Conditions 
     Female Premise 0.50 (1.50)  1.86 (1.03) 8.00 (10.13)  9.20   (8.84) 
     Male Premise 2.43 (1.20)  0.56 (1.14) 11.00 (10.32)  10.40 (10.37)  
 
One-Premise Conditions.  As above, explanations were analyzed first.  A 2 
(premise group) x 2 (group referenced) ANOVA revealed no main effects, both F <1, 
but did reveal a significant interaction, F (1, 28) = 20.42, p <.001, η2 = .42.  
Confirming predictions, post hoc tests showed that participants focused their 
explanations on men more in the female-premise condition, and on women more in 
the male-premise condition.  A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted on the mutability scores 
as above.  Neither the main effects not the interaction were significant (see Table 1).   
 
Discussion 
 
 This experiment replicated two past findings; explanations of gender 
differences focused on women more than men (Miller et al., 1991), and on whichever 
gender constituted the larger effect (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001).   More importantly, the 
principal hypothesis was supported in the one-premise conditions.  Participants 
consistently explained the gender about whom they made a prediction, regardless of 
whether that group was women or men.  In the one-premise conditions the effects of 
male’s greater typicality within the category ‘voter’ were not evident.  One previous 
study has found that conclusions are explained more than premises (Hegarty & 
Chryssochoou, 2005) but Experiment 1 shows that this manipulation is sufficient to 
overcome the effects of typicality within a social category.   Finally, mutability 
judgments did not vary by target gender or condition, suggesting that they are 
unrelated to explanation content (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). 
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Experiment 2 
 
 In the one-premise conditions of Experiment 1, androcentric bias was undone, 
but participants speculated freely about the direction and size of the gender 
differences that they would explain. Experiment 2 examined whether androcentrism 
could be undone even when such estimates were much more constrained.  Participants 
in the two-premises condition were given data about women and men as before.  In 
the one-premise conditions, participants were given the relevant data about one 
gender group and chose one of three options to predict the behaviour of the other 
gender group.  Two of these options were extreme values, which I predicted would be 
chosen by few participants.  The third option was identical to the results presented in 
the two-premises condition.  It was predicted that most participants would then end up 
explaining the same gender difference across the experiment’s conditions.   
 
Method 
 
 Participants.  Thirty-six female and six male university students participated 
(age = 20-29 years, M = 21.2 years).   They identified their nationalities as British (n 
= 35), American (n = 2), Finnish (n = 1), Irish (n = 1), Singaporean (n = 1) and 
Swedish (n = 1).  One participant identified no nationality.   
 
 Method.  Three questionnaires were constructed, akin to those used in 
Experiment 1.  In the two-premises condition the vignette reported that 62% of men 
and 51% of women had expressed an intention to vote.  In the female-premise 
condition, participants were told that 51% of women had expressed an intention to 
vote and were asked to guess which of the following was the corresponding 
percentage for men; 2%, 62% or 99%.  In the male-premise condition, participants 
were told that 62% of men had expressed an intention to vote and were asked to guess 
which of the following was the corresponding percentage for women; 2%, 51% or 
99%.  In all conditions, a prompt to explain the gender differences was presented, 
followed by five blank lines. Finally, a mutability item was presented, identical to that 
used in Experiment 1.    
 
 Procedure.  The procedure and coding were identical to Experiment 1.  
 
Results 
 
 Predictions.  In the female-premise condition, all thirteen participants guessed 
that 62% of men intended to vote.  In the male-premise condition, participants 
guessed that 51% (n = 10), or 99% (n = 5), of women intended to vote.  Thus, 82% of 
participants’ judgments in the one-premise conditions were effectively manipulated.  
 
 Explanations.  Explanations were coded as in Experiment 1.  A 3x2 ANOVA 
was conducted with the premise group (both genders vs. women vs. men) as a 
between-subjects factor and gender group referenced (women vs. men) as a within-
subjects factor.  Neither main effect was significant, both F <1, but a significant 
interaction was observed, F (1, 39) = 13.69, p <.001, η2 = .41 (see Table 2).  Post hoc 
tests revealed that the trend to explain women more then men in the two-premises 
condition was not significant.  However, as in Experiment 1, explanations focused on 
women in the male-premise condition, and on men in the female-premise condition.  
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 Mutability.  Mutability scores were calculated as in Experiment 1.  A 3x2 
ANOVA revealed main effects of target gender, F (1, 39) = 10.82, p<.01, η2 = .22, 
and experimental condition, F (2, 39) = 6.03, p<.01, η2 = .24, and an interaction 
between them, F (1, 39) = 3.09, p<.06, η2 = .14.  In the two-premises conditions, 
women’s and men’s voting intentions were considered equally mutable, t <1.   In both 
one-premise conditions, women’s voting intentions were mutated more than men’s, 
but not in the two-premise condition (see Table 2).  
        
Table 2: References in Explanations and Mutability by Condition, Experiment 2 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses). 
        
Target Group Women Men Women  Men   
Explanations           Mutability 
Premise Group 
     Two-Premises 2.21 (1.63) 1.42 (1.34) 5.50 (3.16)     5.79 (3.64) 
     Female Premise 0.31 (0.63) 2.31 (1.32) 13.54 (6.47)   5.30 (4.29)  
     Male Premise   2.60 (1.92) 0.80 (1.08) 19.80 (19.16)   9.87 (6.13)  
        
Discussion 
 
 Experiment 2 shows that ‘the effect to be predicted’ becomes ‘the effect to be 
explained,’ even when predictions are constrained by forced choice items.   The 
manipulation constrained participants’ responses more when the premise group was 
female rather than male.  Consequently, the most interesting contrast is the one 
between the explanations in the two-premises condition and the female-premise 
condition.  All participants in both conditions explained why 11% more men than 
women might intend to vote.  Yet the contents of these explanations were strikingly 
different.  Explanations in the two-premises condition focused slightly more on 
women.  This finding was consistent with the results of Experiment 1 and was not 
surprising; men were more typical of ‘voters,’ but they also constituted the ‘larger 
effect’.   Both these facts were true in the female-premise condition also, but here 
explanations focused overwhelmingly on men.  In contrast to the results of 
Experiment 1, males were judged to be less mutable in the one-premise conditions.   
 
General Discussion 
  
These two experiments showed that gender differences can be implicitly 
positioned as being ‘about men’ rather than ‘about women’, even within an 
androcentric social category.  Participants presented with data about both genders 
spontaneously focus on women more than men and on the gender who constitutes ‘the 
larger effect.’  Yet, if asked to make a prediction about one gender, participants took 
‘the effect to be predicted’ as ‘the effect to be explained’ regardless of whether that 
group was men or women, or their predictions were unconstrained (Experiment 1) or 
constrained by forced choice items (Experiments 2).  These results are consistent with 
past descriptions of category norms as flexible mental structures constructed ‘on the 
fly’ (Hegarty and Chryssochoou, 2005; Kahneman and Miller, 1986).   
These results build on Hegarty and Chryssochoou’s (2005) findings that 
people explain conclusion groups rather than premise groups in three ways.  First, 
they extend those findings from national groups to gender groups.  Second, they show 
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that the manipulation is sufficient to undo the effect of one group’s greater typicality 
on explanation content.  Third, they show that the effect persists even if participants 
predictions about the conclusion group are radically constrained.  Manipulating the 
typicality of the overarching category has been shown to undo the tendency to explain 
the less normative group (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, Experiment 2; Miller et al., 1991; 
Experiment 3).  However, manipulating the premise group’s identity completely 
reversed the focus of explanation onto the more normative group (see also Hegarty 
and Chryssochoou, 2005, Experiment 4).    
In both experiments presented here, few participants were men, and gender 
differences could not be sensibly examined within each experiment.  Comparing data 
from the 22 men and 80 women in both experiments it was observed that male 
participants made a slightly greater number of references to male voters than did 
female participants (Ms = 1.55, 1.22 respectively) while females made slightly greater 
number of references to female voters (Ms = 1.79, 1.32).  However, neither difference 
was reliable, both t(100) <1.3, both p >.20.  Men and women explained gender 
differences similarly here as in previous research (see Miller et al., 1991).  
There was little evidence to support Miller et al.’s (1991) claims that 
mutability judgments were related to explanation content.  To recap, participants only 
mutated men’s behavioural intentions more than women’s in the one-premise 
conditions of Experiment 2.  While these effects were in the expected direction of 
greater perceived female mutability, the manipulations of the premise group’s identity 
did not appear to affect mutability judgments systematically.   As in Hegarty and 
Pratto’s (2001) experiments, mutability judgments were unrelated to the contents of 
inter-group explanations.  
In conclusion, these experiments not only illuminate cognitive processes 
which underlie the explanation of gender differences, they also have implications for 
the communication of psychological gender differences in non-androcentric ways.  
Hegarty and Pratto (2001) observed that the harmful effects of category norms could 
be undone by focusing attention on the particularities of high status groups such as 
Whites, heterosexuals, and men.  The present studies show one way of doing this.  If 
lead to ponder whether men are similar or different to women, a person must hold in 
mind those characteristics that make men particular, rather than allowing them to 
become background defaults for people of all genders.   The technique of making men 
‘the effect to be predicted’ may be more feasible for oral than for written accounts of 
gender differences, and could be used to present gender differences differently in 
classrooms, diversity trainings, and other settings.  Here, people who are lead to call 
to mind why men are particular might think about gender differences in more even-
handed ways.  They might also spontaneously alight on explanations that androcentric 
thinking would occlude.   
 
Notes 
1.  All post-hoc tests in the paper are Tukey’s HSD (α = .05).   
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